We use panel data of UK workers to examine whether there is evidence of compensating wage differentials for workplace risk, and to recover estimates of the VSL implicit in workers' job choices. Risk data is available at the four-digit industry and three-digit occupation level. We discuss various econometric problems associated with the hedonic wage approach, namely measurement error, instability of estimates and endogeneity. We find that with a classical measurement error, the true risk signal would be completely drowned out in our data, resulting in a dramatic downward bias of the OLS coefficient on risk, whereas a non-classical measurement error would lead to a bias of unknown direction and magnitude. Further, the coefficient on risk changes significantly with the inclusion or exclusion of industry and/or occupation dummies, as well as with the addition of nonfatal risk. Lastly, we employ various estimation procedures that correct for endogeneity, taking advantage of the panel nature of our data, but the coefficient on risk is either not significant, negative or, as in the case of blue-collar workers, disproportionately large. We conclude that if compensating differentials for risk exist, measurement error and other econometric problems prevent us from observing them, and that VSL estimates based on OLS are biased.
I. Introduction
The Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) is a key input into the calculation of the mortality benefits of environmental policies or other safety regulations that save lives.
The VSL is the rate at which individuals are prepared to trade off income for risk reductions. It can be equivalently described as the total willingness to pay by a group of N individuals experiencing a uniform reduction of 1/N in their risk of dying. The concept of VSL is generally deemed as the appropriate construct for ex ante policy analyses, when the identities of the people whose lives are saved by the policy are not known yet.
Ideally, to estimate the benefits of a policy that reduces the risk of dying, we should ask the beneficiaries of the policy how much they are willing to pay for it. When this is not feasible (or the answers obtained not credible), estimates of the VSL from other contexts are applied to the policy under consideration. Clearly, doing so assumes that individuals would apply the same marginal rate of substitution between income and risk in both the original and the new policy context.
Compensating wage studies are a commonly used approach to estimating the VSL. This approach uses data from labor markets. The rationale of compensating wage studies is that workers must be offered higher wages for them to accept jobs with a greater risk of dying, ceteris paribus, and that employers are willing to do so to the extent that it is cheaper than installing safety equipment in the workplace. The demands of workers and the offerings of firms will meet at the tangency points between the workers' indifference curves and the firms' isoprofit curves. The hedonic wage relationship is the locus of these tangency points, and the slope of this locus is the willingness to pay for a marginal decrease in risk. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) survey compensating wage studies and VSL estimates from all over the world. Based on US studies, they recommend VSL figures of $5-9 million. Indeed, the US Environmental Protection Agency relied on 21 compensating wage studies, out of a total of 26 studies, to produce the VSL it uses in its policy analysis ($6.1 million, 2000 dollars) . Estimates of the VSL based on compensating wage studies are available for several European countries, including the UK, where they usually range between $4 and $11 million, and Switzerland ($6.5-9.5 million; Baranzini and Ferro Luzzi, 2001 ).
Can these figures be deemed as credible? Recent research (Leigh (1995) ; Marin (2000, 2001) ; Black and Kniesner (2003) ; suggests that the estimates of the VSL from compensating wage studies are econometrically very fragile, for reasons that include poorly measured workplace risk, collinearity of risk estimates with industry dummies used to account for inter-industry wage differentials, endogeneity, omitted regressors, and heterogeneous preferences for risk and income. We illustrate the severity of these problems and their effects on the VSL using a panel dataset documenting UK workers. To our knowledge, this is the first time panel data are used to study the robustness (or lack thereof) of VSL estimates in the labor market context. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we present the concept of VSL and illustrate how it is usually estimated using labor market data. In section III, we discuss the main econometric limitations of the conventional approach.
Section IV illustrates these limitations and explores possible remedies using UK worker data. Section V concludes.
II. VSL Estimates from Compensating Wage Studies

The Value of a Statistical Life
The VSL is the rate at which individuals are prepared to trade off income for risk reductions:
where R is the risk of dying and WTP is the Willingness to Pay for a reduction in risk,
i.e., the maximum amount that can be subtracted from an individual's income to keep his or her expected utility unchanged for specified levels of risk.
The VSL is derived within an expected-utility maximization context, where individuals are assumed to derive utility from the consumption of goods. Formally, let U(y) denote the utility derived from income y when the individual is alive, V(y) the utility of income when the individual is dead, 1 and let R denote the risk of dying in the current period. Expected utility is expressed as EU=(1-R)⋅U(y)+R⋅V(y). Based on these assumptions, it can be shown that the VSL is equal to
and that the VSL is positive as long as the utility of income is higher when one is alive.
1 This utility would accrue from any bequest the individual plans to make. For simplicity, it is often assumed to be zero. Figure 1 shows the hedonic wage curve, which is the locus of tangency between workers' indifference curves (EU) and the firms' isoprofit curves (OC). In a typical compensating wage study, data are gathered on the wage rate, education, experience, occupation, and other individual characteristics of workers and workplace characteristics.
Estimates of the VSL from Compensating Wage Studies
These data are then used to run a regression relating the wage rate to the risk of fatal and non-fatal injuries, while controlling for education and experience of the worker, and other job and worker characteristics thought to influence wages. One frequently used specification of the wage regression is: What are the VSL figures typically estimated in compensating wage studies? Viscusi and Aldy (2003) survey studies from all over the world, and for the US 2 In empirical work, the logarithmic transformation of the wage rate often replaces w as the dependent variable in the regression. The wage rate, w, and fatality risk, p, are usually measured on an annual basis. 3 Viscusi argues that q must be included in the compensating wage equation. Since p and q are generally highly correlated, failure to do so would result in biased estimates of the β 1 coefficient, and hence of the VSL. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) examine some 60 wage-risk studies conducted all over the world, finding that many of them do not control for non-fatal risk.
recommend a range of $5 to $9 million (2000 US dollars). 4 Recent compensating wage studies based on European labor markets (Siebert and Wei (1994) ; Sandy and Elliott (1996) ; Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) ; Sandy (2001) ) peg the VSL in the range between €4.3 million and €74.4 million. A meta-analysis by CSERGE (1999) generates a range of VSL figures between €2.9 million and €100 million, resulting in weighted average equal to €6.5 million (all 2000 €).
Figure 1
Source: Viscusi and Aldy (2003) . 4 The US Environmental Protection Agency relied primarily on estimates of the VSL from compensating wage studies in deriving the VSL figures it uses in its policy analyses (see US EPA, 2000) . The use of VSL figures from compensating wage studies when computing the mortality benefits of environmental policies has been criticized on the grounds of the fact that it mirrors the preferences of healthy males whose average age is 40, rather than those of the primary beneficiaries of environmental policies-the elderly and those in compromised health. Adjustments to the VSL for remaining life years were subsequently proposed, and eventually repealed.
Using the 1995 Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) and the 1994 Swiss Wage Structure Survey (SWSS), Baranzini and Ferro Luzzi peg the VSL implicit in the choices of Swiss workers in the range of 10 to 15 million Swiss Francs ($6.5 to $9.5 million US dollars). They find that the VSL depends on risk level, union coverage, and age. Using
Eurostat survey data for 1995, Barone and Nese (2002) find no evidence of a significant relationship between wage rates and objectively measured workplace risk in Italy.
III. Limitations of Compensating Wage Studies
We believe that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that many estimates of the VSL based on compensating wage studies are rife with econometric problems. In this section, we discuss four main problems: (1) measurement error in the risk variable, (2) lack of robustness with respect to specification changes, and (3) endogeneity of risk or unobserved heterogeneity in wages and the in the preferences for risk and income.
Measurement Error
The first key issue is how to measure p and q in equation (3). Job choice and wages should be driven by perceived as opposed to actual risk levels, yet researchers have typically measured p and q using official labor statistics (i.e., fatality rates within a certain occupation or industry). 5 Even if the objective risk were correctly measured (a matter we discuss below), merely allowing it to be the unbiased guess of workers' subjective risk estimate is sufficient to make p and q in equation (3) workplace environment, as researchers using the Quality of the Employment survey have done (Summers and Krueger, 1988; Biddle and Zarkin, 1988) , but doing so does not produce an estimate of the VSL.
To address this problem, Black and Kniesner (2003) (3)).
They point out that in some occupations there may be a great deal of heterogeneity in the actual job risk, and job assignment may be non-random in this respect. Consider, for example, the possibility that employers assign male and older convenience clerks to evening and late night shifts, when the risk of robberies is highest, reserving female and younger clerks to daytime hours. If we assign to each convenience store clerk the average risk in this occupation, we overestimate the risk for female and younger workers, and underestimate the risk for male and older workers. 7 In this case, the measurement error is correlated with other variables that appear in the right-hand side of the hedonic regression, resulting in a non-classical measurement error. Similar considerations apply for industry-based risk. Black and Kniesner conclude that even instrumental variable techniques are unlikely to remove the bias, and that the direction and magnitude of the bias of the OLS estimates is unknown.
Instability of Risk Coefficients
Even if one ignores the potential for measurement error, evidence from several studies points to the fact that the estimates of the VSL are not robust to even minor changes in the specification of equation (3), i.e., in the choice of the right-hand side variables. For example, in much empirical work industry dummies are entered in the right-hand side of (3) to capture inter-industry wage differentials, which have been widely documented to exist since Summers and Krueger (1988) . Leigh (1995) shows that because of the high degree of collinearity between risk and industry dummies, when both are included in the regression it is no longer possible to distinguish compensating wage differentials from industry-specific wage differentials.
In a recent study commissioned by the US Environmental Protection Agency, explore the issue of stability of the estimates of the price of workplace risk, using three sources of data about individual workers and two sources of risk data.
They show that (i) the estimates of the coefficient on risk vary dramatically with small changes in the inclusion of covariates in the right-hand side of the regression model; (ii) many of these coefficient estimates are negative, instead of positive; and (iii) using flexible functional forms confirms the OLS results.
Endogeneity or Unobserved Heterogeneity
There is reason to believe that job risk is endogenous with the wage rate, the dependent variable in the regression equation. This is because wage rates are likely to be affected by individual characteristics (e.g., skills) that are not usually well captured using the variables available in most datasets. This source of unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be correlated with one's risk. Another, econometrically equivalent way of stating this is that workers not only choose the job they work in (and thus their wage), but that they simultaneously choose the risk level that they are exposed to. Both unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneous
, which is commonly referred to as endogeneity.
Yet, few empirical studies attempt to correct for endogeneity of wage and risk. In their theory section, Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) treat risk as endogenous, which means that they must instrument for it, and at the same time allow for heterogeneous preferences for risk and income by treating the coefficient on risk as random. However, because of problems of severe collinearity, they were not able to compute reliable VSL estimates when correcting for risk endogeneity, and as a consequence all reported results in that study are based on exogenous risk. 9 In a later study, Arabsheibani and Marin (2001) discuss this issue in detail and refer to poor instruments as the main cause for the collinearity.
Measurement error and self-selection are likely reasons why an earlier effort to estimate a compensating wage model for Italian workers by Barone and Nese (2002) failed to detect a significant relationship between wage rates and objectively measured job risk.
compensating wage studies the error term in the regression model is correlated with the risk variable, making OLS estimates of the price of risk biased. 9 When treating workplace mortality as exogenous, they find evidence of the existence of compensating wage differentials consistent with an average VSL to be around 9.7 million, with lower values for manual workers and larger values for managerial/professional
IV. Application
We illustrate the abovementioned problems using data on worker characteristics We express fatality rates as X per 100,000 a year. For waves 7 and 13, we also have mortality risk at the three-digit occupation level.
As in previous studies, attention is restricted to full-time male workers aged 20-65 living in England and Wales. Because of the very distinct risk-related circumstances of their work environment, we excluded farmers, agricultural workers, firefighters, policemen, soldiers and other security personnel from our sample. 10 We also created a subset of workers in blue-collar professions. 11 Descriptive statistics for the sample are reported in the Appendix.
Measurement Error in our Data
Until recently, workplace fatality rates were computed at a relatively low level of resolution. For example, the majority of the US studies used two major sources of workplace fatality risk: the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which supplies total national counts of deaths by industry (up to the three-digit SIC code) or by occupation (at the three digit SOC level) for each year, and the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), which supplies rates at the one-digit industry or one-digit occupation for the different states.
Clearly, the latter has a low level of resolution, but the BLS data have many missing values, suppress death counts for cells with fewer than 5 deaths, do not account for geographic or seasonal variation in risk, and converting the BLS counts into rates is fraught with difficulties. 12 Even in the absence of these concerns about data quality, one might question the appropriateness of using industry-level risk rates, since this approach essentially treats a miner as facing the same risk as clerical personnel in the mining industry. A secretary, for example, would seem likely to face the same level of workplace risk whether he or she works for the primary metal industry sector or in a food processing establishment, suggesting that risk rates within occupation categories might be better measures of true risk.
12 One must divide death counts by the number of workers in the appropriate cells to form rates. Estimates of the number of persons employed in each industry or occupation are notoriously difficult to obtain. For example, Viscusi (2003) uses the Current Population Survey (CPS) to produce estimates of the number of workers in each industry-occupation cell, but this approach is criticized by Taylor (2004) , who points out that the CPS is not representative of occupations or firms, and uses instead the Occupation-Employment Matrix (OEM). In both cases, an additional source of measurement error is the sampling variation associated with very small cell sizes.
Unfortunately, the potential for misclassifying one's occupation is high: Viscusi By contrast, when by-occupation-only risk measures were used, the coefficient on risk was insignificant. When attention was restricted to blue-collar workers, a substantially higher VSL resulted. This contradicts theory inasmuch as blue-collar workers self-select into more dangerous jobs, and that their average wage is lower than that of the whole sample. If safety is a normal good, then the VSL should increase with income.
Does using risk data with finer resolution help reduce measurement error problems? To answer this question, we turn to our data from the BHPS and the HSE, and compute the covariance between mortality rates at the four-digit industry level (our
and mortality rates at the three-digit occupation level (our [B] ). Clearly, both sets of figures are very close to zero, implying that if the measurement error were truly classical, one would expect the estimates of the VSL based on OLS regressions to be grossly downward biased. Both sets of ratios are similar to-and even lower than-those computed by Black and Kniesner for the US, despite the greater detail of our fatality rate data.
We conclude that even with our 4-digit-level risk data the measurement error seems to be drowning out the "signal" (i.e., the true mortality risk). It would be interesting to find out whether the pervasiveness of the measurement error has increased over the years as mortality rates have been declining (see Figure 2 for overall workplace mortality rates), 14 but the period over which we were able to find mortality rate data at a fine level of resolution is too short and too recent to confirm or refute this conjecture. 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 7 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 4
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Robustness of VSL Estimates to the Inclusion/Exclusion of Variables
As discussed above, earlier literature has suggested that the compensating wage differentials, and hence the estimates of the VSL, may not be robust to adding explanatory variables-such as industry dummies or non-fatal injury risk-to the right- 14 The risk of dying on the job in industrialized countries gradually declined over the past decades. In the UK, fatal accident rates per 100,000 employees fell from about 5.8 in 1959 to 0.7 in 2004. The decline has been quite steady, approximately following an exponential decrease rate of 4.75 %. The shape of the curve since the 1950's indicates that it has become increasingly difficult for employers to decrease workplace accident risk even further. Whereas fatality rates in the ten years between 1959 and 1969 were reduced by 3.1 per 100,000, the corresponding decrease between 1994 and 2004 was only 0.36. If this process continues at the same rate, only 0.28 lives per 100,000 employees will be saved by safety measures imposed between 2004 and 2014. When compared to overall mortality rates, the relative risk of dying on the job has also significantly decreased. For males aged 25-35, the ratio of job risk to overall risk of dying fell from 2.7 % in 1976 to 0.7 % in 2003, the year of wave 13 of the BHPS. For other age groups, the share of job risk in overall mortality risk has similarly decreased.
hand side of the wage equation. Are these results common when fitting hedonic wage equations, or are they specific to the US data for which they were originally claimed?
To answer this question, we specify a linear model similar to equation (3), where the dependent variable is log annual wages and the independent variables include education, experience, experience squared, overtime worked, tenure with the present employer, a good health dummy, a race dummy, union status, regional dummies, plus the risk variable(s) and, depending on the specification, industry and occupation dummies.
The model is estimated using OLS.
The results of this exercise are shown in table 2. They suggest that for the full sample the VSL remains relatively stable when industry and occupation dummies are added to the regression equations (columns A and B, respectively), but that further controlling for non-fatal risk almost triples the VSL (column C), which then falls by almost one-half when industry and occupation dummies are further added.
15
The second panel shows that the VSL is much higher among blue collar workers, 16 and that it changes dramatically when occupation and industry dummies are added in the basic specification, which uses fatal risk only (columns A and B). However, when one controls for fatal and non-fatal risk from the start, the VSL in the no-dummy specification (column C) is similar to that of column A, and adding further industry and occupation controls has a relatively modest effect (a 15% decline) on the VSL.
17 15 The VSL can be calculated as the product of β 2 and average wage, times 100,000 (because risk is given at that level). 16 Caution should be used when interpreting these results. Viscusi (2003) notes that if all accidents happen to blue-collar workers, but fatality rates are computed using all workers in a particular industry as the denominator, blue-collar risk will be understated and their VS: overstated. This problem should disappear when one uses risk by occupation, but this comes at the expense of misclassification and other problems. 17 As Leigh (1995) has shown, apparent wage/risk differentials can be caused by inter-industry wage differentials. In our data, coefficients remained significant even after including industry dummies, which is 
Exploiting the Panel Structure of the Data
To our knowledge, this is the first time a panel dataset is used for the purpose of estimating the price of risk implicit in labor markets. We therefore have the opportunity to explicitly control for all omitted determinants of wage, even when they are correlated with risk. This is usually done by specifying fixed effects (FE) model, i.e., models with individual-specific intercepts, and fitting the so-called "within" estimator, or, alternatively, by adopting random effects (RE) models. The latter use a common intercept for all cross-sectional units, but the error term is broken down into two components, one of which remains fixed over time within one individual (but varies across individuals).
Random effects models are estimated using GLS, which yield consistent and efficient estimates as long as the idiosyncratic component of the error term is probably due to the fact that risk is measured on the 4-digit SIC level, whereas the industry dummies were based on major categories. uncorrelated with the regressors. By contrast, the "within" estimator is robust to the possible correlation of the fixed effects with the regressors. Large differences between the within and GLS estimates of the coefficient on risk would be taken as evidence that the worker-specific effects are correlated with the included regressors.
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Results for the FE and the RE models are reported in the top panel of table 3 for all workers and of table 4 for blue-collar workers. For the full sample, the "within" and GLS coefficients on fatal risk are remarkably similar to one another, and they are negative and significant. They imply that people are, if anything, paid less when they take higher-risk jobs, refuting the very notion of compensating wage differentials. The coefficient on nonfatal risk changes more dramatically across "within" and GLS estimation procedure, but in both cases it is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Blue collar workers are a completely different story: the risk coefficients vary dramatically across the model specification and estimation techniques, but are always statistically insignificant. Even if one ignores for the moment the issue of coefficient significance, only the RE models/GLS estimation produces VSLs that are within the generally accepted range.
Endogeneity of Risk
Even if one ignores the potential for measurement error, it is reasonable to suspect that workplace risk and wages are endogenous. Unobserved individual characteristics that influence wages but get soaked up in the error term of (3) may well be correlated with workplace risk, making the OLS estimates biased and inconsistent.
Various approaches are possible to address endogeneity. The most obvious is to instrument for workplace risk and to estimate equation (3) using 2SLS. We do indeed apply 2SLS, using all of our right-hand side variables plus the worker's marital status, wife's income, number of dependent children, home ownership, and father's social class dummies as our instruments. n/a n/a n/a n/a RE (n=4796)
Coeff. on mortality rates -0.0033346 -0.0036314 -0.0018903 -0.0029294 z-stat -2.23 -2.24 -1.00 -1.48 Coeff. on nonfatal injury rates -0.0000403 -0.0000208 t-stat -1.26 -0.62 VSL n/a n/a n/a n/a 2SLS (n=5638)
Coeff. on mortality rates -0.0357515 -0.0221513 t-stat -2.18 -1.08 VSL n/a n/a Garen proc. (n=5638) Coeff. on mortality rates -0.0347135 0.0049412 t-stat -2.19 0.34 VSL n/a 10.16 Coeff. on mortality rates -0.0030382 -0.0031122 -0.0027392 -0.0028191 z-stat -1.89 -1.97 -1.36 -1.46 Coeff. on nonfatal injury rates -0.00000851 -0.0000088 t-stat -0.25 -0.27 VSL n/a n/a n/a n/a Marin (2000, 2001) propose to treat risk as endogenous and preferences for risk and income as heterogeneous by allowing the coefficient on risk to be random. Formally, fatal and non-fatal risks are expressed as
In equations (6) and (7), the vector z i includes all covariates contained in x i plus, as per the definition of instrument, additional variables that determine risk choice but are not correlated with the error term in the wage equation. We chose non-labor income, the number of children, and dummies for marriage and social class of the father (for summary statistics see Table A1 in the Appendix).
Coefficients 2 β and 3 β in equation (3) 
Garen (1984, 1988) proposed a consistent two-step estimation procedure for this model.
In the first step, one runs OLS on equations (6) and (7) and forms the residuals i 2 ε and i 3 ε . In the second step, one runs OLS on the equation:
The results from 2SLS and the Garen procedure are displayed in the second panel of table 3 (for the full sample) and table 4 (for blue-collar workers). For simplicity, we restrict attention to the models that include only fatal risk. Again, for the full sample of workers the risk coefficient is always negative, refuting the notion of compensating wage differentials for risk. By contrast, with the blue-collar subsample, these two instrumentalvariable procedures results in large coefficients on risk and correspondingly large VSLs ranging from 70 to 102 million pound sterling.
These results are not credible, and we believe that the explanation is that the instruments we used do not explain much of the variation in p i , something that the Garen procedure would seem to be very vulnerable to. Only roughly 3-5% of the variation in job risk for all workers can be predicted using the instruments, with the remainder being absorbed into the residuals i 2 ε . As a consequence, the residuals are highly correlated with job risk, and with ε and i p is 0.98 for all workers and also for blue-collar workers, which explains why the regression coefficient β 2 is so sensitive to the inclusion of the residuals. 19 Arabsheibani and Marin (2001) report that they encountered the very same problem during their own hedonic wage regressions, despite the fact that they have a broader set of instruments and much better first-stage R squares, and concluded that compensating risk differentials extracted in this way should be viewed with great caution due to multicollinearity.
Given how difficult it is to find suitable instruments for risk, is it possible to exploit the panel structure of the data and an estimation technique developed by Hausman and Taylor (1981) to remedy the problem of correlation between unobserved characteristics of the worker and risk? Consider the regression equation:
where y i is a T×1 vector of observations on the dependent variable for individual i, X i is a T×k matrix of time-varying regressors and Z i is a T×G matrix of time-invariant regressors. In the term in brackets, i v is the individual-specific component of the error term, ι is a T×1 vector of ones, and i η is a T×1 vector of independent error terms. After stacking individual vectors and matrices of variables, equation (10) , where the subscripts 1 and 2 denote the exogenous and endogenous subsets, respectively. The Hausman-Taylor is an instrumental-variable approach corrected for the non-spherical nature of the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms in the brackets in equation (11):
, and A is a matrix of instruments. Hausman and Taylor propose using (i) the deviations from the individual's means of the X 1 , (ii) the deviations from the means of Z 1, (iii) the X 1 and the Z 1 as instruments.
We report the results of the Hausman-Taylor procedure in the second panel of tables 3 and 4 for all workers and the blue-collar sample. We treat education as an endogenous time-invariant regressor, and experience, experience squared, tenure, union status, and occupation dummies as endogenous time-varying regressors. Race, good health, geographical dummies, job overtime, and industry dummies are regarded as exogenous variables. The results show that whether or not one controls for non-fatal risk, the coefficients on fatal risk are negative, but negligible and statistically insignificant.
V. Conclusions
Unlike previous studies, we use panel data documenting wages and other individual characteristics of UK workers to examine whether there is evidence of compensating wage differentials for workplace risk, and to recover estimates of the VSL implicit in workers' job choices. We have risk data at the four-digit industry level and three-digit occupation level.
If occupation-and industry-level risks are both assumed to be observing true risk with measurement error, and this measurement error is be assumed to be classical (i.e., uncorrelated with individual characteristics in the right-hand side of the wage equation), the measurement error in our data drowns out the true risk signal and results in a dramatic downward bias of the OLS coefficient on risk, understating the VSL. In addition, one measure serves only as a very poor instrument for the other, and cannot be used to instrument for it and correct for the downward bias.
We also employ estimation procedures that correct for endogeneity, but the coefficient on income is either negative or, as in the case of blue-collar workers, disproportionately large, to the point that one would infer the VSL to be in the range of £70 to 102 million (1996 £). We attribute the latter result to a combination of two factors.
The first is that our instruments are very poor. The second is that our risk data most likely understate the risk for blue-collar workers, and are more reliable when used for all workers.
Our panel data offer us the unique opportunity to control for unobserved worker characteristics that influence both wages and workplace risk. Fixed effects models, which we estimate using the "within" estimator, allow the individual-specific effects to be correlated with included worker characteristics-and find no evidence of compensating wage differentials. We also use the Hausman-Taylor estimation approach in hopes of increasing efficiency while allowing for the endogeneity of risk and other covariates, and again find no significant association between wages and risk.
We conclude that if compensating differentials for risk exist, measurement error and other econometric problems prevent us from observing them. Alternatively, it is possible that our approach-which looks at all workers and then specifically at bluecollar workers-is insufficient to capture segmented markets, and that ignoring such segmentation flaws the results. One might also question the appeal of the wage hedonic approach in the presence of a high degree of market segmentation.
In addition, many dangerous jobs in industrialized countries are carried out by relatively unskilled workers, often coming from abroad. These workers may not have the option of choosing among a (theoretically) unlimited array of jobs with associated wages and job risk. They may be qualified to carry out only certain tasks associated with industries and occupations that offer relatively low salaries. It is not clear whether compensating wage differentials would be observed for these workers. If there still exists a wage/risk differential, much more detailed and reliable risk data are needed. Perhaps one promising approach is to identify an exogenous change in safety law and to observe how wages adjust after that, but we have not been able to identify data that lend themselves for such an approach. 
Appendix.
